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Assimilation, Resistance, and Recent
Transsexual Marriage Cases
Anthony S. Winer1
In the field of Sexuality Law, there is a current debate among certain
activists and commentators concerning “assimilation” and “resistance.”2
Some assert that the goal of assimilation should guide policy choices. The
view may be, for example, that by framing the goals of sexual minorities in
the context of the values of the larger population, the larger population will
identify more readily with sexual minorities and be more receptive to policy
changes that benefit these minorities. On the other hand, other critics and
advocates assert that the situation of sexual minorities is so unique, and
their genuine needs so radically distinct from those of the dominant
population, that assimilation is inimical to the minorities’ cause, and
resistance is the only appropriate approach. The predominant debate tends
to presume that these two approaches are mutually exclusive.
Recent developments on the issue of transsexual marriage cast doubt on
the usefulness of this dichotomy. Transsexual people who enter into legal
marriages with persons whom they consider to be of the opposite sex can be
said to be engaging in behavior that is simultaneously assimilative and
resistive. In advocating for the concerns of people in this position then,
activists and commentators cannot neatly pin their theoretical foundations
exclusively on either assimilation or resistance.
This theoretical observation is put in sharp relief by recent events. The
last few months have witnessed major developments in this country in the
case law of transsexual identity, particularly transsexual marriage. Recent
cases decided by the high courts in Kansas3 and Maryland,4 and by a trial
court in Florida,5 serve to emphasize the degree to which transsexual people
living in opposite-sex marriages are engaged in behavior that cannot be
explained as solely assimilation or resistance.
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A more useful theoretical basis for analyzing the efforts of transsexual
people in this context comes from the late work of Michel Foucault.
Specifically, Foucault’s development of the idea of “askēsis” can serve as a
basis for understanding and advancing the movement for transsexual
marriages. Adoption of this approach can move the analysis that courts
have been using in this area in directions that will be more inclusive and
less tied to social and theoretical stereotypes.

DEFINITIONS OF ASSIMILATION AND RESISTANCE
Initially, I offer my own definitions of assimilation and resistance.6
These definitions capture the dynamics of the Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/
Transgender (GLBT) experience, while at the same time being sufficiently
general so as not to lose sight of the foundational meanings of the terms
themselves. These definitions are as follows:
• assimilation is undertaking a set of behaviors patterned after the
behavior of members of a social group for the purpose of securing
a place in that group;7
• resistance is undertaking a set of behaviors amounting to a
rejection of the need to secure such a place.8
An example of assimilation in this sense would be a young gay male
developing an interest in playing conventionally masculine team sports (for
example, football or hockey) in an effort to secure a place in the societal
group of young athletic men. An example of resistance would be a young
gay male choosing instead to pursue an individual sport (such as tennis or
swimming), in part as a means of demonstrating the lack of a need to secure
a place in the societal group of players of conventionally masculine team
sports. A further example of resistance, of course, would be a young gay
male choosing not to participate in sports of any kind, but rather focusing
on activities such as art, fashion, or theater, thereby demonstrating a
rejection of the behaviors of the dominant societal group.9
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One observation that emerges from these definitions is that the same act
can be characterized as assimilative or resistant, depending on which
societal perspective is adopted. This can be illustrated using the sample
factual circumstances discussed above. If, in rejecting team sports, the gay
male chooses instead to develop an interest in grand opera, one might say
that he was engaging in resistance behavior, because grand opera is far
removed from stereotypically male interests such as team contact sports,
boxing and automobile racing. On the other hand, he could be said to be
assimilating into certain dominant expectations regarding stereotypical
interests of gay males.10
It might be asserted that assimilation is best thought of as being
assimilative into a dominant group or sub-culture. In this sense of the term,
adopting behaviors of gay male opera fans would not be assimilation
because the group whose behavior is being adopted is not socially
dominant. However, this is an unsatisfying approach. For me, the
mechanisms of assimilation and resistance are interesting. Whether one is
attempting assimilation into a dominant or non-dominant group, one is still
adjusting behavior to secure a place in the group. The psychological
aspects of the decision to assimilate (or resist) still involve an exercise of
self-definition, regardless of the direction in which one is assimilating (or
resisting).

THE FLUIDITY OF ASSIMILATION AND RESISTANCE WITHIN
TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE
The fluidity of the supposed dichotomy between assimilation and
resistance is well illustrated by considering the prototypical fact pattern of
transsexual marriages that have become the subject of recent court cases. In
these situations (described more fully below), a transsexual person who has
undergone sex reassignment surgery has married a non-transsexual person
of the primary sex other than the sex transitioned-to. Facts develop after the
marriage is entered into calling its validity into doubt. Either one spouse
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subsequently dies and there is a dispute over the estate,11 or there is an
attempt to obtain a court order for maintenance payments,12 or there is a
child custody dispute,13 or some other basis for legal challenge14 emerges.
At this point, it is worth considering certain general aspects of this
prototypical fact pattern to investigate further, what assimilation and
resistance mean. First, the decision to recognize one’s self as transsexual
involves an internal resistance to societal forces. Conventionally, a person
born with a particular anatomical sex, but experiencing the identity of the
other primary anatomical sex, is expected to assimilate. That is, the person
is expected to adopt behaviors (particularly in styles of dress) characteristic
of the assigned anatomical sex at birth. Refusing to adopt these behaviors
can be viewed as resistance.
This mode of resistance is all the more acute when a transsexual person
undergoes sex-reassignment surgery, as in each of the cases discussed
below. One might feel that there could be no greater resistance than
completing a surgical procedure to reject biological traits that would
otherwise be seen to exert a requirement to assimilate. On the other hand,
undergoing sex reassignment surgery can also be viewed as an act of
assimilation. A person identifying as a member of one sex, but bearing
physical characteristics of the other primary sex, voluntarily and at some
burden and expense, undertakes a physical operation to be more like the sex
of identification. Although the mechanism for change is physiological
rather than behavioral, a type of assimilation takes place.
The prototypical fact pattern in the recent cases seems to involve even a
greater degree of assimilation as the transsexual person marries a nontranssexual spouse. Heterosexual marriage between one man and one
woman is the norm for marital relationships in this country; indeed, it is the
only form of marriage sanctioned by the laws of any state.15 Traditional
marriage is so emblematic of conventional relations between the sexes that
social critics, such as feminists16 and queer activists,17 have viewed it as
problematic for years.
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Accordingly, entering into a traditional male-female marriage can be
viewed as significantly assimilationist for any couple. This is even more
dramatically true when one spouse is a post-operative transsexual. The act
of marriage to a non-transsexual spouse would be behavior that has the
effect of placing the transsexual spouse very much in the center of expected
societal norms for persons of the gender transitioned-to.18
The insufficiency of a dichotomous approach would come as no surprise
to those at the vanguard of the current transgender movement. Some of the
most active and aggressive advocates for transgender issues are rejecting a
strict dichotomy of male and female. Gender for them is not a question of
either/or. Rather, gender is perceived as existing in a wide variety of forms.
Once again, it is best to be clear at the outset regarding terminology. In
this essay, the word “transgender” is used as an umbrella term that covers
transsexuals, transvestites, and all those who identify (for one purpose or
another, or to one extent or another) with a sex other than that with which
they were born. The phrase “transsexual person,” on the other hand,
specifically references a person born with physiological characteristics of
one sex, who desires to live as a member of the other primary sex.
The traditional view of transsexualism was susceptible to conforming to
the conventional dichotomy between male and female. One was born as a
male, but identified as a female, or one was born as a female, but identified
as a male. This presented the choice to a transsexual person of whether or
not to opt for sex-reassignment surgery. By viewing that choice as a matter
of either assimilation or resistance, the analysis ultimately resulted in a
degree of ambiguity and equivocation, as noted in the discussion above. A
transgender person’s transition to a different sex could be viewed as both
resistance and assimilation. It could be seen as resistance because the
person was behaving in a way that rejected the anatomical sex at birth. It
could also be seen as assimilative because in adopting the behaviors, dress
and physiognomy of the sex of identification, the transitioning person was
making use of conventionally defined patterns of gender presentation.
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However, the rejection by many modern transgender activists of the
male/female dichotomy eliminates this ambiguity. For these activists there
is no perceived need to solidly identify as either completely male or
completely female.19 Rather, they can refer to a “constellation” of genders
and eschew the idea of one’s gender being exclusively male or female.20
Accordingly, the need to undergo surgery, or even assume any consistent
form of sexual identity, does not exist.
Of course, one can consider this developing constellation approach to
gender as being squarely on the resistance side of the assimilation/resistance
divide.
Eschewing the conventional male/female dichotomy is a
revolutionary approach, essentially rejecting a tenet that many would regard
as socially foundational. One might therefore assert that the development
of the constellation approach is a straightforward example of resistance, and
that the assimilation/resistance dichotomy still retains analytical vitality.
Even with the constellation approach to gender, most transgender people
would still be making use of tropes of masculinity and femininity. The
identification of certain characteristics with one of the two primary sexes is,
at least for the moment, inescapable. Even if a transgender person refuses
to identify solely as male or female for all purposes, or at least for some
purposes at a given point in time, that person’s identification will be made
of a collection of factors and influences (style of dress, hair style, jewelry,
make up, gait, demeanor, voice, etc.). Even if the totality of these factors
and influences is conventionally ambiguous, each one will still key
individually into established norms of sexual identification.
Accordingly, even under the vanguard constellation approach to
transgender identity, there is substantial fluidity between the concepts of
assimilation and resistance. It is difficult to say in any given instance
whether one is assimilating or resisting, since the same act can be viewed as
an example of either phenomenon at the same time. Indeed, the situation of
transgender people in the current environment solidifies, rather than
weakens, this observation.
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FLUIDITY OF IDENTIFICATION AND THE LATE WORK OF MICHEL
FOUCAULT
The work of French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault has been
extremely influential in recent years.21 His work includes significant
references to the idea of resistance,22 and accordingly may be viewed as a
progenitor of the assimilation/resistance dichotomy.
Among the most significant23 of Foucault’s later works were The Use of
Pleasure24 and The Care of the Self.25 In these works, Foucault investigates
selected philosophical sources from antiquity to determine the origins of
intellectual views of sexuality.26 Two of the main themes developed in these
volumes are askēsis, practical training of an individual in order to form as a
moral subject,27 and “the cultivation of the self,” a fundamental and timeconsuming process requiring concentration on the individual soul and its
development.28
Carlos Ball has given substantial attention to these works and has
emphasized that they evince attention to “technologies of the self,” which
allow individuals to undertake “a certain number of operations on their own
souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being.”29 He concludes that the
classical approaches elucidated by Foucault had as their goal a
transformation “in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity,
wisdom, perfection or immortality.”30
Although these final works by Foucault have attracted less attention than
those produced earlier in his career, other commentators have also provided
some attention to them. For example, David Halperin has investigated
Foucault’s idea of askēsis in detail.31 He determined that although it bears
some relation to the modern idea of asceticism, it was not necessarily a
form of self-denial.32 Rather, Halperin sees it is an exhortation to the
pursuit of discipline to achieve well-being and self-actuation, rather than
repression. It thus can transform a person who experiences gratifications
and desires without understanding and control, into a person who
understands, controls, and deploys them for optimal self-actuation.
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In these late works, Foucault seems to suggest that being governed by a
sensitivity akin to classical askēsis can be productive. Although these late
volumes certainly do not say so explicitly, Foucault seemed to be going in
the direction of concluding that modern individuals should at least consider
the possibility that optimal behavior in sexual areas could be best informed
by an enlightened development of the self. This would no doubt be as
opposed to an externally-imposed legal code of behavior, but quite possibly
a socially-imposed code as well, even if it were not explicitly legal in
character.
A modern kind of askēsis, understood as a care of the self, can thus
present an analytical tool distinct from an assimilation/resistance
dichotomy. A part of the problem with the assimilation/resistance
dichotomy, as outlined above, is that its meaning depends on a reference to
a societal group. One is either assimilating to an explicit societal group or
sub-group, or rejecting it through resistance. Since society always consists
of numerous sub-groupings, and since human motivations are almost
always multi-dimensional, any analysis along the assimilation/resistance
spectrum must to a degree be ambiguous and indeterminate.
However, focusing on a more “Foucauldian” idea of askēsis does not
require a societal reference in order to derive meaning. Rather, the precepts
of conduct can emanate from one’s own self-cultivation, the product of a
lifetime of sincere and honest inquiry, reflection, and experimentation. This
dynamic is more consonant with the modern transsexual experience than a
dichotomy of assimilation and resistance. A given behavior or set of
behaviors may partake of both assimilation and resistance at the same time,
but perhaps this is not important. What may be more important is the
development of the self and the process of askēsis through which it arose.
The process undertaken by transsexual people is a paradigmatic example
of what Foucault must have been suggesting as a modern idea of askēsis. A
male-to-female post-operative transsexual, for example, pursues a process
of self-development and self-definition with diligence and determination, in
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an effort to achieve well-being. It is a demanding and arduous process that
warrants respect. It is a prime example of an “operation on the soul . . . in
order to attain a state of happiness”33 and produce a transformation to attain
self-actuation.34
Given that this is the case, it should not matter whether the transformative
process is viewed within the mold of assimilation or resistance. A
transsexual’s own definitions of his or her own self should be what matters,
not his or her relationship with societal expectations. If the theoretical
focus on the assimilation/resistance dichotomy is not helpful in viewing
transsexuals generally, it certainly is even less helpful when considering the
case of transsexuals in opposite-sex marriages, since there the distinction, as
shown above,35 is even less determinate. The ultimate implication is that if
the dichotomy is not helpful in the context of transsexual marriage, it may
not be very helpful in viewing other aspects of queer experience either.
In the transsexual marriage cases described below, the courts wrestle with
the process of defining the sex of transsexual persons for purposes of
applying state marriage laws. There is some degree of progress, from an
activist’s perspective, in the way more recent decisions have considered a
broader set of criteria in defining sex. However, even this broader approach
can be viewed as basically an exercise in assimilationist analysis. It will be
shown that this creates unfortunate implications. At some point, the
assimilationist model will be insufficient, and an approach more akin to
Foucauldian askēsis will become more appropriate.

RECENT TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE CASES
Through the end of the 20th Century
Until the end of the 1990’s, the situation involving transsexual marriage
in the United States was relatively clear. Although one state intermediate
appellate court found in favor of the legitimacy of a marriage involving a
transsexual person, four other decisions in four other jurisdictions, one
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issued by the highest civil court in the state, found against the validity of
such marriages.
The favorable decision was M.J. v. J.T.,36 decided by the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. The facts involved a
transsexual woman who, after the completion of sex-reassignment surgery,
had engaged in a ceremonial marriage with a man, from whom she later
sought a court order for maintenance.37 Upon the instigation of her suit for
maintenance, the man argued that the plaintiff was not a woman and that
therefore the marriage was void. The court held that, upon the completion
of a person’s successful reassignment surgery, there was no legal barrier to
prevent that person from marrying a person of the sex that was opposite to
the transitioned-to sex.38
The four negative cases could be treated as a related series, beginning
with Corbett v. Corbett.39 Corbett was actually an English case, but it had
been, and continues to be, cited by U.S. courts so consistently that it came
to be viewed as integral to U.S. case law on the subject. The facts involved
a male-to-female transsexual who had undergone sex-reassignment surgery
prior to her marriage with a man. The English court determined that “the
biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest),
and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the
opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means.”40 The court determined the
three tests that should be used for sexual identity should be chromosomal,
gonadal, and genital.41 By these standards, the transsexual woman was a
man, and therefore the marriage was void.
The next case in the series was Anonymous v. Anonymous, a New York
State Supreme Court case from 1971.42 The facts were unusual for cases in
this area, in that the non-transsexual spouse claimed, and the court found,
that prior to the marriage there had been no knowledge of the other party’s
transsexualism. The court held that the marriage was not valid.
The remaining cases were In re Ladrach,43 from an Ohio county probate
court in 1987, and Littleton v. Prange,44 from the Texas Court of Appeals in
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1999. Ladrach falls outside of the prototype for these cases, because the
issue was joined when the transsexual applied for a marriage license,
whereas the other cases involve the validity of a marriage that has already
occurred. The Texas case has been the more influential of the two, in part
due to its provenance from the highest civil appellate court in the State.
Both Ladrach and Littleton cited Corbett, and both determined that the
marriage, or requested marriage, involving the transsexual person was
invalid.
These early cases indicated that U.S. courts would probably look at a
restrictive set of factors, primarily chromosomal, gonadal, and genital
characteristics, in determining sex for purposes of marriage. The New
Jersey court in M.T. v. J.T. was an exception, but even that opinion did not
include a detailed discussion of various factors that could be used in
determining sex. Rather, the court seemed to base its determination that the
male-to-female transsexual was a woman for purposes of marriage on the
fact that she had undergone sex-reassignment surgery.45
In re Gardiner in 2001 and 2002
It appeared as though the situation might change in 2001 with the
issuance of the intermediate appellate court opinion for In re Estate of
Marshall G. Gardiner.46 In Gardiner, the court adopted a detailed and
multifaceted approach to determine sex for the purpose of marriage. The
state supreme court overruled this approach in 2002.47 However, the
approach of the intermediate court had nonetheless been published, which
established the possibility of more favorable rulings elsewhere in the future.
The facts involved Marshall Gardiner, a northeast Kansas businessman
who had accumulated “some wealth.” Somewhat later in life, he married
J’Noel Ball, who was a post-operative male-to-female transsexual.
Marshall had a son, named Joe, by an earlier marriage, from whom he was
estranged at the time of his marriage to J’Noel. Marshall died intestate, and
Joe and J’Noel filed opposing court papers concerning the proper
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disposition of Marshall’s estate. Joe ultimately asserted in these papers that
the marriage between Marshall and J’Noel was invalid, on the theory that
J’Noel was a man under relevant Kansas statutes, and that under Kansas law
there could be no marriage between persons of the same sex.48
The state trial court found that the marriage was invalid, because J’Noel
was born a male and, in the court’s view, remained a male for the purposes
of Kansas’s marriage law.49 The Kansas Court of Appeals, however,
determined that the issue of whether an individual was male or female at the
time of marriage is a matter of fact in each case. The appellate court held
that a trial court “may use chromosome makeup as one factor, but not the
exclusive factor, in arriving at a decision.”50
The appellate court adopted the criteria suggested by Professor Julie
Greenberg in a 1999 law review article as the additional factors a trial court
should consider.51 These criteria were: gonadal sex, internal morphologic
sex, external morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex
and gender of rearing, and sexual identity.52 The appellate court reversed
the trial court and remanded for a full hearing, to allow each side to present
evidence on at least the factors enumerated in the Greenberg article.53
At that time, many GLBT and transgender activists viewed this result as
salutary. Clearly, the appellate court’s insistence that sex be determined
according to a variety of factors, rather than merely chromosomes, seemed
less narrow and less hostile than previous decisions resting on
chromosomes alone. Nevertheless, there was cause for some misgivings
regarding the appellate court analysis. The Court of Appeals still was
treating J’Noel’s sex as a “question of fact.”54 The employment of this
approach in some cases could lead courts to find that some transsexuals,
even those who had undertaken substantial steps to transition, were still not
of the sex of identification.
Furthermore, under the appellate court’s approach, a transsexual person’s
status could depend on the extent of that person’s assimilation. That posited
assimilation could be of a particularly onerous variety. For example, a
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male-to-female transsexual could be considered female to the extent her
various characteristics approximated those of someone born female. Yet, as
much as she might wish to be considered female, and as much as that desire
would be valid, everyone would concede that she, in fact, was not born
morphologically female, at least not completely.
Accordingly, not only was the endeavor prescribed by the appellate court
one of assimilation, but it required a transsexual wife in such a case to
assimilate to that which all would agree she was not: someone who had
been born morphologically female. Her marital rights thus depended on the
extent to which her assimilation had approximated something that she
admittedly was not. Theoretically, this was not a completely comforting
result even if it did help J’Noel’s position from the standpoint of the legal
strategy.55
This observation illustrates the perils of attempting to use an
assimilationist strategy in the legal context. Assimilationism is, in many
instances, an approximation to something that is not. This is the case for
the gay man attempting to become like heterosexual men by adopting an
interest or facility in team sports. However, the fact that he might succeed
in adopting the interest or facility, and thus assimilate into a social group of
heterosexual men, does not mean that he himself is not gay. When “the
chips are down” and “push comes to shove,” when it really matters whether
one is gay or straight, his assimilation may not protect him.
Similarly, a male-to-female transsexual may assimilate into the context of
heterosexual marriage by marrying a man. But, when the situation becomes
greatly intensified, as in the case of a contest over the husband’s estate, if
her rights depend on the extent to which she has assimilated into the role of
someone who was born female, the results may be no less negative. It
would be open to a trier of fact to determine that, although she may well
have assimilated in many respects, she still had not assimilated enough.
One suspects that in the minds of some triers of fact applying the Kansas
appellate court’s test, no collection of characteristics could amount to
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adequate assimilation. The model toward which assimilation was directed,
being born a female, was something that could never strictly be achieved.
It would be better in such cases to employ a test that did not depend on
the extent of assimilation measured by objective factors. It may be
understandable why the Kansas appellate court employed this approach.
However, a more welcoming and more humane approach would focus
simply on the extent of the self-identification experienced by the
transsexual woman herself. This approach would also be more in line with
the Foucauldian idea of the culture of the self and the deployment of
individual askēsis.
In any event, even under Kansas law, the importance of a married
transsexual’s degree of assimilation was short-lived. Less than a year after
the appellate court’s opinion in Gardiner, the Kansas Supreme Court
reversed in all respects relevant to this discussion. The court’s opinion was
couched in non-inflammatory terms, and it included copious and lengthy
verbatim quotes from the appellate opinion. However, the actual effects of
this opinion may be more chilling, and more vicious, than its nonconfrontational rhetoric would indicate.
Whereas the appellate court had treated J’Noel’s sex as a matter of fact,
the supreme court stated, “[w]e view the issue in this appeal to be one of
law and not fact.”56 Quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary, the supreme
court defined marriage, in relevant part as, “the legal status, condition or
relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, or until
divorced.”57
In perhaps the most chilling passage, the supreme court declared simply
that “[t]he words ‘sex,’ ‘male,’ and ‘female’ in everyday understanding do
not encompass transsexuals.”58 Thus, the court seemed to be saying that in
order to be married under Kansas law, one needs to have the sex of either
male or female, and transsexuals are not encompassed by either term.
It does not take much to supply what may be the most apparent
conclusion to these major and minor premises. Namely, that under Kansas

LAW & SEXUALITY

Assimilation, Resistance, and Recent Transsexual Marriage Cases

law it may be that transsexuals may not marry at all, regardless of the sex of
their chosen partners. This, at any rate, seems to be the most direct reading
of the state supreme court’s opinion. Given the stunning import of the
court’s approach, it was almost anti-climatic for the court to offer, in
concluding its discussion on this point, that “J’Noel does not fit the
common meaning of female.”59
Post-Gardiner Cases from February 2003
In February of 2003, a trial court in Florida and the highest court in
Maryland both issued decisions that seem, at first glance, to advance the
interests of transsexuals. The opinions contain much that is positive.
However, the trial court opinion provides a further indication of the dangers
of an assimilationist analysis, and the Maryland court is actually silent on
the most salient points regarding transsexual marriage.
In the case of In re the Marriage of Michael Kantaras,60 the Sixth
Judicial Circuit Court for Pasco County, Florida issued an exceptionally
detailed opinion, 809 pages in length. The case involved a post-operative
female-to-male transsexual, Michael Kantaras, who married a nontranssexual female, Linda. The couple was married for nine years before
filing cross-petitions for divorce and custody of the two children they had
raised together.61 Linda’s court papers contended that, because Michael
was born a woman, the marriage was void.62 The court determined that
Michael was a male and that the marriage was legal.63 The court went on to
award primary residential custody to Michael.64
Kantaras determined that there were essentially five factors that
established that Michael was legally a male: (1) as a child his parents and
siblings, observing his male characteristics, agreed he should have been
born a boy; (2) Michael had always perceived himself as a male and had
played male sports, performed male household chores, and refused to wear
female clothing; (3) prior to marriage he had “successfully completed the
full process of transsexual reassignment;” (4) at the time of the marriage,
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Linda was informed and accepting about Michael’s transsexual status; and
(5) before and after the marriage, Michael had been accepted as a man in a
variety of social and legal ways.65
The result of the Kantaras decision, the detail and care with which it
treated its subjects, and the comparatively broad scope of factors it took into
account in arriving at its determination, can all be viewed as positive for the
transsexual cause. It remains to be seen, of course, whether the decision
will survive any possible appeals or subsequent holdings. Even apart from
later judicial developments, the approach the trial court took is problematic
with respect to the assimilationist dangers discussed above.
The emphasis that the Kantaras court placed on full sex reassignment
surgery raises a problem. The complete language of the court’s ruling on
this point is as follows:
Prior to marriage he successfully completed the full process of
transsexual reassignment, involving hormone treatment,
irreversible medical surgery that removed all of his female organs
inside of his body, including having a male reconstructed chest, a
male voice, a male configured body and hair with beard and
moustache, and a naturally developed penis.66
By placing such a pointed emphasis on the completeness of the surgical
and physiological processes, the Kantaras court adopts an assimilationist
approach. The approach of the court in Kantaras is similar to that of the
intermediate appellate court in Gardiner. The approaches are also different
in some respects. In Gardiner, the court numerically listed seven biological
and experiential factors that should be considered when judicially
determining sex, whereas in Kantaras, the court puts substantial weight on
the completeness of sex-reassignment surgery.
However, in both cases the emphasis is on the degree to which the
transsexual person has conformed himself or herself to a person who was
born with the sexual morphology of a person of the transitioned-to sex. As
noted earlier in the discussion of Gardiner, the result of this approach is that
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the transsexual’s case hinges on the extent to which he or she resembles
something that he or she is not, someone who was born with the anatomical
morphology of the transitioned-to sex.
The difficulty becomes more apparent if one posits a situation like that of
Michael Kantaras, but where the medical or surgical procedures have been
less extensive. For example, someone who has received hormone treatment
and some medical treatment to alter secondary sex characteristics, but has
not undergone invasive surgical alterations of primary sex organs. It seems
quite possible that, based on the rationale of the Kantaras decision, such a
person will not have “successfully completed the full process of transsexual
reassignment.”
A more satisfactory approach, and one more in keeping with a
Foucauldian idea of askēsis, would rely not so much on the fullness of the
medical process engaged in, but rather on the extent of everything the
transsexual person had done. Such factors as the length of time Michael
had been living as a man, the commitment he had exhibited to living as a
male, and the extent to which he had taken steps to alter his legal status for
legal, professional and social purposes would all be primary factors.
The other positive case development in February of 2003, was the
opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals in, In the Matter of Robert
Wright Heilig; Janet Heilig Wright.67 This case involved a female-to-male
transsexual who petitioned for an order that would change his name and
also change his sexual identity designation.68 The trial court refused to
grant the petition, concluding that gender was not subject to modification.69
The Maryland high court vacated and remanded with instructions. The
court’s opinion contains a concise, but inclusive, review of medical
authorities on the subject of transsexualism.70 The court came to a
conclusion that is welcome in the transsexual community, “a person’s
psychological gender identity has received recognition as one of the
determinants of gender and plays a powerful role in the person’s psychic
makeup and adaptation.”71 The high court also stated, “gender … may be,
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or possibly may become, other than what is recorded on the person’s birth
certificate.”72 The court vacated the trial court’s ruling, since that ruling
had concluded that gender was not subject to modification, and directed the
trial court “to consider admissible evidence relevant to the issue” as to
whether the petitioner had changed his sex.73
As affirmative as this may seem for transsexuals, the Heilig case is
problematic in two pivotal respects. First, the opinion is deliberately vague
on what a petitioner must show to successfully obtain an order reflecting a
change in designated sexual identity. To the extent it gives guidance on the
issue, the opinion, in line with Kantaras, places significant emphasis on
surgical operations.
The Heilig court’s discussion does not list factors to consider, but simply
recites the requirement in effect in many states that, in order to change a
birth certificate, the individual’s gender must have been changed “by
surgical procedure.”74 The court observes that laws requiring surgery as a
condition to recognizing a change in sex “rarely, if ever, specify the kind of
surgery that will suffice.”75 The court goes on to warn that, “[a]ny reasoned
legal conclusion [must] be based on admissible evidence of medical fact.”76
The court purposely concludes thereafter, without giving any further
indication as to what one must do in order to successfully obtain a
designation of changed sex. What the court does provide suggests the preeminence of a surgical procedure and other physiological operations.
Again, this leaves open the possibility discussed regarding the Gardiner
intermediate holding and the Kantaras opinion. The indication of these
decisions is that, where the court determines that a person’s physiological
changes are not full or complete, the individual may not receive a positive
result. This, in turn, reflects the unsuitability of an assimilative approach.
The second problem with Heilig, in this context, is that it explicitly
excludes any direct relevance to the subject of marriage. In directing the
trial court to reconsider the requested sex-change designation, the court
emphasized that it was not opining on “what the collateral effect of any
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judgment attesting to a change in gender might be.”77 The possibility that a
legal change of sex can affect a person’s capacity to marry is relegated to a
long footnote that cites Corbett, M.T. v. J.T., Littleton and Gardiner.78 But
having referenced these cases and after briefly discussing some related
points, the court concludes at the end of this footnote that “[t]his is an issue
that is not before us in this case and upon which we express no opinion.”79

CONCLUSION
The particular analysis and holding in the Kansas Supreme Court’s
decision of the Gardiner case may have destructive effects for transsexuals
in Kansas. If such an approach is adopted broadly by other states, the
consequences for transsexuals around the country could be devastating.
Indeed, they could well provide added evidence for the assertion by Paisley
Currah and Shannon Minter that, in many contexts, transsexuals are not
viewed as fully human.80 Fortunately, recent cases may presage a move
away from these consequences, but it will be important for the transgender
and GLBT communities to keep track of these developments and take
appropriate action.
I have focused on the circumstances of transsexual marriage from a more
theoretical perspective. My intent has been to explore what the legal
treatment of marriages involving transsexuals has to say about the dynamic
of assimilation and resistance. The application of these two terms cannot
help but be indeterminate and ambiguous in the context of GLBT issues.
The journey of the Gardiner case through the Kansas state courts, in
particular, illustrates the difficulties that can arise when courts, and perhaps
litigating parties as well, apply analytical techniques sounding in the
assimilation/resistance dichotomy.
From a theoretical perspective, ideas about assimilation and resistance
may ultimately turn out to be less useful than other, more individuallydirected, ideas. An example would be the kind of cultivation of the self and
individual askēsis developed by Michel Foucault in his History of Sexuality.

VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003

671

672 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Such a view approaches sexuality issues from the standpoint of the need to
effectuate those transformations of the self that result in a state of optimal
fulfillment. Indeed, for some time, transsexuals and transgender activists
have explored and experienced the pull of the self in the forces that define
their lives. The true imperatives of this issue are less about assimilation or
resistance, and more about self-fulfillment.
Specifically, the imperative for askēsis would dictate that substantial
weight be given to the experience of the transsexual spouse in transitioning
from one sex to the other. It is an improvement when courts credit a broad
set of factors to determine sex in these cases, but there is danger as well, to
the extent that the factors used evince an assimilationist perspective. A
more comprehensive improvement involves placing the transitioning person
in more direct control of the determination of sex, through emphasis on his
or her own discipline and commitment to the endeavor.
The endeavor of sexual transition, as experienced by the person
undergoing the transition, is an exercise in Foucauldian askēsis. With
regard to the long-term suitability of the interests of transsexuals, the most
meaningful factors to consider should accordingly be those related to the
ascetic endeavor of the individuals involved including: length of time spent
living as the transitioned-to sex; actions taken to effectuate the transition for
legal, social, and professional purposes; and other elements of the
transsexual person’s own experience. These factors should be given
substantial weight in addition to, and perhaps even as primary over,
physiological factors.
The alternative approach I am suggesting is hardly free of difficulty. It
does however, have the advantage of beginning from precepts less
dependent on relations to the other, and more dependent on relations to the
self.
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